


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



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
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
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


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





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


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
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
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
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
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
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



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


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








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
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
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
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



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









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
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
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
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\*\*\*\*\*\*\*INITIAL ERT ANALYST COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS

Send to interested CIOC team POCs, Corps POC, and ONR POC

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS FOR FINAL DRAFT \*

#### Analyst

• If for Sunday BUA, ensure your slide tells the story on its own...there will be no script as this slide is for the CG Read Book, not a briefing (there is no BUA on Sundays!)

•Ensure your slide contains only up to SECRET/REL USA MCFI material (CI Team will vet for "DISPLAY ONLY TO IRQ")

•Save final as date for Sunday or desired date of presentation, use format of BUA 2007MMDD

•Send with supporting message traffic to(b)(3), (b)(6and(b)(3), (b)(6for approval NLT 1200 (Sunday BUA Slides due 1200 Friday)

(b)(3), (b)(6)Approver

 Remove "Draft" watermark from the slide master, return to analyst with comment (verbal or written) Analyst


•Send final slide draft with supporting message traffic to (b)(3), (b)(6) bv 1400. (If for Sunday, point out that no script is required for the CG Read Book).


(b)(3), (b)(6) (briefer) and ERT (DL MNF-I CIOC •After A&P review, Analyst send to Reconciliation and Engagement Team) with all traffic and (DL MNF-I CIOC INFOMANAGEMENT)


requesting slide (and script, if for a non-Sunday BUA) only be moved to CENTRIX


 Analyst send CENTRIX slide to (b)(3), (b)(6) (briefer) and the BUA team (CENTRIX: DL MNF-I CIOC BUA)


 Liaison with (briefer) around 2100 (b)(3), (b)(6)





















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





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
	For disp	lay only to IRQ	34
Timin	g of ISI	(b)(6)	Denial
<ul> <li>ISI (b)(6) Denial Ti</li> <li>18 July - CF publicly a confessions of (b)</li> <li>23 July - ISI publicly d their top intermediarie</li> </ul>	announced (6) lenied arres		f (b)(6)
Diyala Denials Timeline • 19 June - CF stated 30 – 20 June - ISI issued 1 100 IP killed – 23 June - ISI issued i ISI followers	two denials,	claimed 60	d CF, situation, clarified four trut
<ul> <li>26 June - CF stated ap – 27 June - ISI issued of</li> </ul>	oproximate denial, dema	ly 60 AQI o anded proof	operatives killed of allegations
Quick replies illustrate close mo countering of negative AQI pres effort to devise response accept	ss. Five-day la table to ISI fol	g to counter	(b)(6) statements indicat ble disruption due to CF operation
	\$	0,	
	69		




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


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(S/MCFI) The crossing site at Safwan, IVO Navistar, is the only commercial crossing site between Kuwait and Iraq. Separating commercial and military activity at this critical junction is important militarily, economically and politically. ASR Aspen allows military equipment and most sustainment supplies to move from the port to Iraq without traversing any urban stretches of highway. Safwan is highly unstable and has a history of high criminal activity and low security presence. control. A crossing site that by-passes Safwan would avoid this threat. (S/MCFI) The main threat groups along southern portion of MSR Tampa are Jaysh al-Mahdi and the Badr Organization. Explosively Formed Penetrators (EFP) are the primary weapon employed by JAM in MND-SE



(S/MCFI) ASR ASPEN is a unlit, 25-26 foot wide, two-lane, soft-shoulder road. As mentioned earlier, ASR Aspen allows for 12 hour directional traffic from K-crossing to MSR Tampa. HET's, which comprise 25% of all

MNC-I traffic, require a minimum of 28 feet for two-way traffic. (S/MCFI) There is currently work underway to have RRP Radio Coverage throughout the entire route, but that project is currently ongoing.


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
**(S/MCFI)** EFPs are typically passive infra-red (PIR) or command wire (CW) initiated. Since July 2006, approximately 93% of all EFP's with identified initiation types along MSR Tampa from K-crossing to the intersection with Aspen were PIR initiated. PIR initiators detect a heat differential due to motion. When it detects the heat a switch closes and the detonator on the EFP is initiated. The main threat area for these types of devices is the intersection of Tampa and Aspen.


**(S/MCFI)** The border area with Navistar continues to be a problem area with criminal activity. Hijackings remain prevalent in Safwan, a border village near Navistar.

(S/MCFI) ASR Aspen is 108 kilometers long and passes through mostly empty desert, and bypasses 150 kilometers of Iraqi/Kuwaiti interstate road with much higher civilian traffic volume. It provides substantially better force protection by it's shear isolation away from any major populated areas.

Completion of the MSR Aspen Road Project will shorten the time required to transport military goods from Kuwait City north towards Baghdad. Should mitigate attacks against CF support convoys. With the TOA of Basrah province in Aug 07, insurgent and criminal elements, will exploit new security gaps in MND-SE, include probable CF interdiction along MSR Aspen.







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